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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Was the trial court's decision to grant the State's motion 
for summary judgment incorrect since it is well established 
that summary judgment may be granted only where there is no 
issue of any material fact, and the factual issues of 
whether Penman had endured unusual circumstances that 
prevented him from appealing the denial of his Motion to 
Withdraw, were at issue? 
II. Was it incorrect for the trial court to decide on a motion 
for summary judgment that denial of Penman's writ of habeas 
corpus would not constitute a substantial denial of his 
rights where Penman has not yet had an appeal in the lower 
court and, for procedural reasons, is no longer entitled to 
one? 
III. Since court-appointed counsel failed to follow the require-
ments of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration at 4-604 
(withdrawal of counsel in criminal and delinquency cases) in 
withdrawing from Penman's case, was it correct to determine 
that the incarcerated petitioner was not prejudiced by 
counsel's withdrawal 12 days prior to the appeal deadline 
and petitioner was not sufficiently instructed regarding the 
filing of the notice of appeal? 
IV. Since it is well established that summary judgment may be 
granted only where there is no issue of any material fact, 
was the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment 
incorrect as to Penman's allegations that Rule 11 had not 
been strictly complied with and consequently his Guilty and 
No Contest pleas were unlawful? 
V. Was it incorrect for the trial court to deny Penman an 
evidentiary hearing on the merits of his writ, thereby 
disregarding his assertions of violation of due process and 
his accompanying documents that substantiate that certain 
state witnesses had perjured themselves and that the 
prosecuting attorney failed to disclose this fact? 
Standard of Review. Correctness. Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 
547 (Utah 1989). "In considering an appeal from a dismissal of a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, no deference is accorded 
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the lower court's conclusions of law that underlie the dismissal 
of the petition." Id. at 549. 
Pages 1-27, 287 and 292 of the Record establish that these 
issues are appropriate for appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from the ruling of the lower court on 
June 15, 1995, wherein the Honorable William B. Bohling concluded 
that although appellant's counsel failed to comply with Rule 
4-604, Code of Judicial Administration, and in spite of the fact 
that petitioner alleged that Rule 11 was not complied with when 
he entered his guilty plea, appellant was not prejudiced thereby. 
Therefore, the Court granted respondent's motion for summary 
judgment and denied Penman's request for an evidentiary hearing. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case 
Below. 
The action stems from Penman's October 28, 1988 no contest 
plea to manslaughter and guilty plea to robbery. In June of 
1989, acting pro se, Penman filed in the Third District Court a 
Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Motion to Withdraw Pleas, and 
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Motion In Forma Pauperis. On October 1, 1990, the Court 
appointed Jerald McPhee as his counsel. Mr. McPhee was called to 
arms in the Persian Gulf in November of 19 90 and the Court 
subsequently, on January 8, 1991, appointed attorney Mark Madsen 
to represent Penman. 
On June 27, 1991, Penman filed a writ of habeas corpus. At 
the hearing, the Board of Pardons said the record was unclear and 
inconclusive. 
On August 14, 1992, the Court denied appellant's Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
On September 1, 1992, Penman received a letter from his 
attorney, Mark Madsen, informing him that he intended to withdraw 
as his attorney. Mr. Madsen withdrew during the time in which a 
notice of appeal should have been filed regarding Penman's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea. However, no notice of appeal was 
filed. 
On April 29, 1994, Penman filed a Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. The Attorney General's Office responded to 
Penman's habeas corpus request by filing a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the basis that appellant should be procedurally 
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barred from raising claims in a post-conviction proceeding that 
could have been raised on direct appeal. 
On March 20, 1995, the Honorable William B. Bohling, after 
hearing oral argument, granted the Motion for Summary Judgment by 
ruling that in spite of Penman's claim that his counsel failed to 
comply with Rule 11 and in spite of the fact that Penman's 
previous attorney failed to comply with Rule 4-604, Code of 
Judicial Administration, Penman was nonetheless not prejudiced 
thereby. 
C. Factual Background. 
1. Roger Eugene Penman ("Penman") was originally charged 
in January 1988 of committing second degree felony homicide, 
aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary and two counts of theft 
stemming from a robbery/homicide which allegedly occurred on or 
about November 1, 1987 at 111 South Allen Street, Midvale, Utah, 
wherein the victim of an apparent robbery, Spencer Nielson, was 
shot and killed. (R. 5 and 77.) 
2. Between the dates of November 1, 1987 and November 14, 
1987, two juvenile suspects suspected of committing the crimes 
were arrested by detectives of the Midvale Police Department. 
-5-
These juveniles subsequently confessed and were thereby charged 
with first degree felony murder and incarcerated pending certi-
fication as adults. (R. 5 and 78.) 
3. At approximately the same time that the certification 
proceedings were pending against the juveniles, a high-speed 
chase occurred between Green River, Wyoming and Rawlins, Wyoming. 
Arrested pursuant to that chase, was Monte Dean uBo" Johnston 
(subsequently Penman's accuser) and Penman. A third individual, 
Wendall Devon Baer who had eluded authorities, was arrested in 
Craig, Colorado, made bail and has not been seen since. (R. 5 
and 78.) 
4. Subsequently, Wyoming authorities recovered from both 
Johnston's and Penman's vehicles, oriental artifacts similar to 
those taken from the Nielson residence. Furthermore, 2 0-gauge 
shotgun shells were recovered from both Johnston's truck as well 
as Penman's jacket pockets. (R. 6 and 78.) 
5. On or about 18 December 1987, Monte Johnston telephoned 
Detective Stark of the Midvale Police Department (the same 
detective who coerced the juveniles' confessions). Johnston 
indicated to Detective Stark that Johnston would provide 
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information on two homicides in Utah, specifically that of 
Spencer Nielson as well as another (the latter Johnston's 
landlord Mr. John Poff), in exchange for favorable treatment, 
i.e., amnesty. (R. 6 and 78.) 
6. At this time, and based upon the erroneous charges 
against, and the coerced confessions from the two juveniles by 
the Midvale Police, the case was transferred to the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Department. Prior to said transfer, however, 
Detective Stark received an immunity agreement from Mr. Walter 
"Bud" Ellett (of the Salt Lake County Attorney's office) for 
Johnston. (R. 6, 7 and 78.) 
7. By this time appellant had been returned to the State 
of Nevada on allegations regarding a violation of his probation. 
During Penman's incarceration in Nevada, charges were filed 
against him on the basis of Johnston's unsworn statements. 
Whereupon, Penman filed for a 180-day disposition of detainers 
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act and on or about 
April 4, 1988 was returned to the State of Utah. (Copies of the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers are on file with the Nevada 
State Prison Records Department, the States of Nevada and Utah, 
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the Utah County Attorney's Office, as well as the Utah Public 
Defenders Association.) (R. 7 and 78.) 
8. Subsequently, detectives Stark and Jerry Thompson went 
to Green River, Wyoming to interview Johnston. In the course of 
that interview, Johnston indicated how Penman, Wendall Devon 
Baer, State's witness Rick Lewis (Baer's brother) and Johnston 
had gone to the Nielson residence on Halloween night (on early 
morning November 1, 1987). All were allegedly armed. Johnston 
alleged Penman possessed a 20-gauge shotgun. Johnston further 
described the theft of the oriental artifacts. He also alleged 
that he and Penman reentered the Nielson residence whereupon 
Penman shot and killed Mr. Nielson with a 2 0-gauge shotgun. 
(R. 7, 8 and 79.) 
9. Further, and during the interview with Johnston and 
Detectives Thompson and Stark, Johnston told of a murder of 
another individual named John Poff. He described in detail the 
location of Mr. Poff's body, refrained from informing the 
detectives that Mr. Poff was his [Johnston's] landlord and 
further withheld facts regarding Mr. Poff's death. (R. 9 and 
79.) 
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10. Additionally, Johnston not only admits to lying in his 
five unsworn statements but Johnston also has a Utah arrest 
record for giving police false information. (R. 9.) 
11. Another individual detained by the police was Rick 
Lewis a.k.a. Kevin Baer. He either desired or was induced to 
cooperate with authorities in exchange for reduced charges and/or 
immunity. Subsequently, a sworn statement taken from Mr. Lewis 
by the Prosecuting Attorney on February 4, 1988 implicated Penman 
in the robbery, burglary and theft charges, but substantially 
conflicted on other issues including who actually committed the 
homicide. Lewis was then held in the Salt Lake County Jail on a 
material witness warrant where it was later discovered that Lewis 
was also known as Kevin Baer, brother of Penman's co-defendant 
Wendall Devon Baer and further, that he had an outstanding 
fugitive from justice warrant regarding a commitment to the Ohio 
State Penitentiary. A subsequent polygraph indicated 
truthfulness on Lewis' part. (R. 10 and 80.) 
12. Lewis remained in the Salt Lake County Jail while 
Johnston supposedly remained in jail in Green River, Wyoming. 
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Johnston pleaded guilty in Wyoming on felony eluding charges and 
was placed on probation by Wyoming authorities. (R. 10 and 80.) 
13. It was made clear to both Lewis a.k.a. Baer and 
Johnston that any violation of their agreements to testify would 
result in full prosecution of all charges. (R. 11 and 80.) 
14. Shortly before Penman's preliminary hearing and prior 
to being served a subpoena, Johnston absconded and to the best of 
appellant's knowledge has not been apprehended. Moreover, no 
warrant was issued for Johnston's arrest by the State of Utah. 
(R. 11 and 80.) 
15. Prior to his preliminary hearing, Penman was appointed 
counsel Frances Palacios of the Salt Lake Public Defenders 
Association to represent him. (R. 11.) 
16. During Penman's preliminary hearing, the Prosecuting 
Attorney improperly induced a stipulation from defense counsel 
Palacios that Johnston had been served with a subpoena to appear 
in court. (R. 12.) 
17. Further, the Prosecuting Attorney apparently elicited 
false and/or perjured testimony from State's witness Rick Lewis, 
allowed that testimony to go uncorrected, and failed to disclose 
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the State's grant of immunity to Lewis in exchange for his 
testimony. (R. 12.) 
18. Defense counsel Palacios knew or should have known 
these facts. If she knew of them, she acted in collusion with 
the state prosecutor by entering into a fraudulent stipulation 
with him and by failing to inform the court that Johnston had not 
been subpoenaed. Moreover, Attorney Palacios knew or should have 
known the nature of State's witness Rick Lewis' false and per-
jured testimony as well as the nature of his immunity agreement. 
Again, if she knew of these facts yet allowed the court and the 
defendant to be fraudulently misled, she acted in collusion with 
the State prosecution resulting or otherwise raising to the level 
of conflict of interest. Likewise, if attorney Palacios failed 
to learn the full nature of these facts then simply, her 
performance as counsel was ineffective and her performance fell 
below an "objective standard of reasonableness." (R. 13.) 
19. Additionally, Penman's defense counsel (Frances 
Palacios) failed to inform Penman that motions to suppress 
Johnston's inculpatory statements could be filed, failed to make 
any attempt to insure Johnston's presence at the preliminary 
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hearing and failed to attempt to impeach State's witness Rick 
Lewis (the only witness placing Penman at the scene of the crime) 
even though Lewis made false and perjured testimony on the stand 
at Penman's preliminary hearing. (R. 222.) 
20. Moreover, during the time of Penman's arrest up to the 
date of the entrance of Penman's pleas, and on the advice of 
counsel Palacios, under the false premise that efforts were being 
made to locate his accuser (Monte Johnston) and that preparations 
were being made on his behalf and in his defense, waived his fast 
and speedy trial rights as mandated under the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers Act, Articles IV (c) and VI (a), as well 
as the Utah and United States Constitutions. (R. 14-15.) 
21. On October 28, 1988, Penman, a layman unskilled in the 
law, not knowing the nature of the foregoing and on the advice of 
counsel Palacios, entered a no-contest plea to manslaughter and 
guilty plea to robbery. (R. 15.) 
22. Penman is now in possession of documents that 
corroborate all of the above allegations, including: 
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(a) results of a ballistics test from the Washington, D.C., 
FBI Laboratory which was compiled on August 12, 1988, 
six weeks before he entered his pleas; 
(b) documents (a sheriff's report as well as a February 4, 
1988 sworn statement between the prosecutor and Lewis) 
which establish ulterior motives for State's witness 
Rick Lewis to testify; and 
(c) a court minute entry verifying that Johnston was not 
served a subpoena. 
(R. 225 and 226.) 
23. Penman's No Contest plea was not based on his admission 
of guilt in this matter, but upon his fear of receiving life 
imprisonment if he pled not guilty and was forced to defend 
himself against Lewis and Johnston's testimony. (R. 222.) 
24. At Penman's plea hearing, Rule 11 was not strictly 
complied with and Penman did not understand the elements of the 
crimes that he pled No Contest to. Page 7 of the plea hearing 
transcript makes the only mention of Appellant's understanding of 
the elements of the crime as follows: 
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And you understand the elements of both of those 
charges. Now, what is your plea, then, to robbery, 
count 2 Robbery, Second Degree? 
(R. 16 and 58.) 
25. Penman's pleas entered October 28, 1988 were entered 
unknowingly and involuntarily. He was not sufficiently informed 
of the elements of the crimes by the court, the prosecutor or 
defense counsel. He was not informed that he was admitting to 
the act of killing or to being an accessory to murder. Moreover, 
the facts that set forth the factual basis of the charge for 
which he entered his plea misled him. Therefore he did not 
realize the actual conduct within the charge of which he now 
stands convicted. (R. 27.) 
26. If Penman had understood the nature of the charges 
against him, he would not have entered the pleas in question, but 
rather, would have entered the plea of not guilty and proceeded 
to trial. (R. 223.) 
27. Post conviction, Penman has been treated by the parole 
board as the actual perpetrator of the homicide and/or as an 
aider and abettor of the same. Had Penman been informed by the 
court that his pleas would result in his being treated as a 
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murderer or an accomplice in the act of murder, he would not have 
entered the pleas in question but in the alternative, he would 
have exercised his right of trial by jury. (R. 223.) 
28. After his return from the Nevada State Prison to the 
Utah State Prison and in August of 1989, Penman's Commitment 
Order was amended in his absence, striking a plea of guilty to 
criminal homicide manslaughter to reflect a no contest plea to 
that charge. (R. 25.) 
29. In June 1990, acting pro se and after repeated failed 
attempts to seek assistance from the attorneys of record, Penman 
filed in the Third District Court a Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel, Motion to Withdraw Pleas, and Motion In Forma Pauperis. 
On July 9, 1990, Penman was brought before Judge Rokich of the 
Third District Court. During this proceeding, his Motion to 
Withdraw his pleas was not heard, but his Motion for Appointment 
of Counsel was granted. (R. 24 and 224.) 
30. In October 1990, Penman still had not received counsel, 
so he notified the Utah State authorities. Judge Rokich then 
ordered Penman before him on October 1, 1990 and appointed 
attorney Jerald McPhee as his counsel. However, before 
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Mr. McPhee could handle Penman's case, he was called to arms in 
the Persian Gulf in November 1990. Penman immediately notified 
the Court and on January 8, 1991, attorney Mark Madsen was 
appointed to represent him. (R. 24 and 224.) 
31. On June 27, 1991, Penman filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
against the Utah State Board of Pardons, Case No. 91904119, Judge 
Rokich. The court granted the petition for a new hearing. At the 
hearing, the Board of Pardons said the record was unclear and 
inconclusive. (R. 24, 224-225.) 
32. On August 14, 1992, the court denied appellant's Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea. (R. 23.) 
33. On September 1, 1992, Penman received a letter from his 
attorney, Mark Madsen, informing him that he intended to withdraw 
as his attorney. Penman tried to telephone Mr. Madsen but was 
unable to reach him. (R. 23.) 
34. Penman was under the impression that before Mr. Madsen 
could withdraw, the judge would conduct a hearing and determine 
if such withdrawal was appropriate. He also assumed that the 
appeal period for filing a Notice of Appeal would be tolled until 
such a hearing was held. (R. 225.) 
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35. Penman never received any documentation from the Third 
District Court permitting Madsen to withdraw from his case. 
(R. 225.) 
36. Moreover, he never received a copy of Mr. Madsen's 
Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel. (R. 23 and 225.) 
37. In May 1994, Penman received newly discovered evidence 
in regards to this case which was released to him from the Utah 
Board of Pardons through the Labrum1 disclosure requirements, of 
which he did not have previous knowledge. (R. 225 and 226.) 
38. The documents released to him disclosed information of 
exculpatory nature in regards to ballistic tests conducted by the 
Washington, D.C. FBI Criminal laboratory as early as August 12, 
1988, two months prior to the entrance of his pleas. (R. 226.) 
39. The documents also disclosed information regarding 
ulterior motives for the State's witness Rick Lewis to testify; 
that indeed Lewis had an immunity agreement with the State; that 
the State failed to disclose these facts; and that Lewis had 
perjured himself while under oath. All these facts were pre-
viously unknown and undisclosed to Penman. (R. 226). 
labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993). 
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40. It was not until September 24, 1993, that Judge Rokich 
released documentation from his court verifying that a subpoena 
was not served on State's witness Monte Bo Johnston. (R. 226.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. A Writ of Habeas Corpus Is an Appropriate Means of 
Redress for Penman's Claims. 
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute 
for appeal. However, in certain situations, a writ of habeas 
corpus is appropriate even if an appeal has not been taken. In 
this case, such a writ is appropriate because (1) when entering 
his guilty and no contest plea, the Court failed to ensure that 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, was complied with; 
(2) Penman had received ineffective assistance of counsel prior 
to and during the period when he entered his plea; (3) Penman was 
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to comply with Rule 4-604, 
Code of Judicial Administration, upon withdrawing as Penman's 
attorney and thereby prejudiced his right to appeal; and (4) 
since entering his plea, Penman has learned of exculpatory 
evidence that existed at the time of the entry of his plea; 
however, Penman received no notice of such evidence. 
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Had these unusual circumstances mentioned above and dis-
cussed below not occurred, Penman would not have been persuaded 
by his attorney to enter a plea of no contest. Instead, he would 
have had a preliminary hearing, which is his substantial right, 
and received the benefit of the additional exculpatory evidence 
at trial. 
B. Penman Did Not Understand the Nature and Elements of 
the Offenses When He Entered His No Contest Pleas. 
Both guilty and no contest pleas must be entered in strict 
compliance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
the burden of ensuring that such compliance exists is placed on 
the trial courts. 
Penman did not understand the nature and elements of the 
offenses and his pleas. Furthermore, the trial court failed to 
cover each element and ensure that Penman understood such 
elements. The Utah Supreme Court has held that this type of plea 
colloquy is improper. The record in this case is devoid of the 
basic elements regarding the Court's duty to ensure compliance 
with Rule 11. Therefore, Penman was never accorded real notice 
of the true nature of the charges against him. 
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C. Penman Was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel When 
Mr. Madsen Failed to Properly Withdraw as Penman's 
Attorney. 
Rule 4-604, Code of Judicial Administration, requires that 
an attorney may not withdraw as counsel of record in a criminal 
case without the approval of court and that a motion to withdraw 
as an attorney in a criminal case shall be made in open court 
with the defendant present. 
When Mr. Madsen withdrew as Penman's attorney, only 12 days 
remained for Penman to file a notice of appeal regarding the 
Court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty verdict. 
Penman was under the impression that counsel would be appointed 
him and believed that the period for filing a notice of appeal 
would be tolled until such appointment was made in compliance 
with Rule 4-604, Code of Judicial Administration. Accordingly, 
no notice of appeal was filed. Therefore, Penman was prejudiced 
by his counsel's failure to comply with Rule 4-604, Code of 
Judicial Administration. Such deficiencies on the part of 
counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings are suffici-
ently egregious to deprive Penman of the effective assistance of 
counsel and constitute a violation of Penman's due process. 
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D. Penman Was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel at 
His Preliminary Hearing. 
Prejudice may be shown by establishing that but for 
counsel's deficient performance, a reasonable probability exists 
that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty. Penman was 
denied effective assistance of counsel during the time of his 
preliminary hearing and during the preparation and investigation 
phases of his case and during the proceedings when he entered his 
pleas. Penman maintains that his defense counsel provided 
ineffective assistance and/or acted in collusion with the state 
prosecution in violation of Penman's rights. Such improper 
actions by Penman's counsel and the prosecuting attorney estab-
lish grounds for granting Penman's request for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
E. Penman Would Not Have Pled No Contest Had He Known of 
the Additional Exculpatory Evidence. 
Failure to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant who 
specifically requests such evidence violates that defendant's due 
process. Since entering his no contest plea, Penman has 
discovered several important items of evidence which, had he been 
aware of when he entered his plea, he would not have pled no 
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contest. Such evidence includes: (1) results of a ballistics 
test that was exculpatory in nature; (2) documents which estab-
lish ulterior motives for the State's witness, Rick Lewis, to 
testify, that Lewis had an immunity agreement with the State, 
that the State failed to disclose these facts, and that Lewis 
perjured himself while under oath; and (3) documents establishing 
that a subpoena was not served on a State's witness, Monte Bo 
Johnston. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS AN APPROPRIATE MEANS OF 
REDRESS FOR PENMAN'S CLAIMS. 
Penman acknowledges that generally, a writ of habeas corpus 
is not a substitute for appeal. However, the facts clearly 
indicate that several reasons exist why Penman has been 
improperly and unlawfully incarcerated: First, Penman did not 
understand the nature and elements of the offenses to which he 
entered a guilty plea. This is in direct violation of Rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 
2
 The requirements of Rule 11 were formerly contained in Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-11. Since the Rule 11 provisions at issue are 
identical to the former statute, under which Penman's pleas were 
taken, all references will be to Rule 11. 
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Secondly, Penman did not have effective assistance of 
counsel during the period when he entered his no contest plea. 
In connection with his no contest plea, Penman has also alleged 
fraud on the part of the prosecutors and collusion of his 
counsel. Penman also received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when Mr. Madsen improperly withdrew as counsel and failed to 
preserve Penman's appeal. 
Third, since entering his no contest plea, relevant evidence 
that was unavailable when Penman entered his no contest plea has 
since been discovered that would have altered Penman's plea had 
he known of such evidence. 
Under Utah law, all of these allegations, standing alone, 
are sufficient to receive an evidentiary hearing pursuant to a 
writ of habeas corpus. See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1036 
n.6 (Utah 1989). Thus, Penman did not circumvent procedure by 
petitioning for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
Furthermore, Utah courts recognize that habeas corpus can be 
used to challenge a judgment or conviction in unusual circum-
stances "where an obvious injustice or substantial and prejudi-
cial denial of a constitutional right has occurred, irrespective 
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of whether an appeal has been taken." Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d at 
1035 (emphasis added). 
In Hurst v. Cook, the Supreme Court of Utah articulated 
the duty upon Utah courts regarding writs of habeas corpus as 
follows: 
We must never lose sight, however, of the fact that 
habeas corpus is the precious safeguard of personal 
liberty. That jurisdictional questions only are 
reachable by the writ is not such an inflexible rule as 
cannot yield to exceptional circumstances. It may be 
better to say that the rule which apparently limits the 
scope of the writ to jurisdictional questions is not a 
rule of limitations, but a rule defining the appropri-
ate spheres in which the power should be exercised. 
Thus it has been held that the writ will lie if the 
appellant has been deprived of one of his constitu-
tional rights such as due process of law . . . 
The function of a writ of habeas corpus as a post-
conviction remedy is to provide a means for 
collaterally attacking convictions when they are so 
constitutionally flawed that they result in fundamental 
unfairness and to provide for collateral attack of 
sentences not authorized by law. The general judicial 
policy favoring the finality of judgments cannot, 
therefore, always prevail against an attack by a writ 
of habeas corpus. As important as finality is, it does 
not have a higher value than constitutional guarantees 
of liberty. Protection of life and liberty from 
unconstitutional procedures is of greater importance 
than is res judicata. 
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Id. at 1034-35. The court further emphasized the flexibility 
that courts should exercise when handling habeas corpus writs, by 
stating the following: 
[T]his Court has frequently addressed and resolved the 
merits of claims asserted in petitions for writs of 
habeas corpus even though the issues raised were known 
or should have been known at the time of conviction or 
initial appeal . . . 
It follows, and it has long been our law, that a 
procedural default is not always determinative of a 
collateral attack on a conviction where it is alleged 
that the trial was not conducted within the bounds of 
basic fairness or in harmony with constitutional 
standards. 
Id. at 1035-36. 
Penman is asking that he merely receive the rights to which 
he is constitutionally entitled. Had the unusual circumstances 
mentioned above and discussed herein, not occurred, Penman would 
not have been persuaded by his attorney to enter a plea of no 
contest. Instead, he would have had a preliminary hearing, which 
is a substantial right, and received the benefit of the addi-
tional exculpatory evidence at trial. 
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II. PENMAN DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND ELEMENTS 
OF THE OFFENSES WHEN HE ENTERED HIS NO CONTEST 
PLEAS. 
Utah law allows writs of habeas corpus in cases where the 
appellant did not understand or was not fully apprised of the 
elements of the plea. See Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 342 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Both guilty and no contest pleas must be entered in strict 
compliance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State 
v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "Rule 11(e) 
squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that 
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when 
a guilty plea is entered." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 
(Utah 1987). A trial court's failure to strictly comply with 
Rule 11 in accepting a guilty or no contest plea constitutes good 
cause, as a matter of law, for the withdrawal of that plea. 
State v. Smith, 812 P.2d at 476. 
Strict Rule 11 compliance must be demonstrated on the record 
at the time the guilty or no contest plea is entered.3 State v. 
3
 For purposes of Rule 11(5), a no contest plea is treated the 
same as a guilty plea. Rule 11 was renumbered and slightly 
altered in 1993. 
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Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah 1987). The strict compliance 
analysis is based on whether the plea affidavit and the colloquy 
with the court, taken together, demonstrate strict Rule 11 com-
pliance. State v. Smith, 812 P.2d at 477. Rule 11(5) states in 
relevant part: 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or 
no contest, and may not accept the plea until the court 
has found: 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial, 
and to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he 
waives all of those rights. 
(d) the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the 
plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements; 
(Emphasis added.) 
Because of the importance of compliance with Rule 11, the 
law places the burden of establishing compliance with those 
requirements on the trial court. State v. Gibbons, 74 0 P.2d at 
1313. 
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Penman did not understand the nature and elements of the 
offenses and his pleas. Moreover, Penman signed plea affidavits 
for both of the charged offenses before the trial court at a 
preliminary hearing on October 28, 1988. The Court in Gibbons 
recognized that to make a knowing plea, the defendant must under-
stand the elements of the crime charged and the relationship of 
the law to the facts. 740 P.2d at 1312. 
Penman pled "no contest" to the charge of manslaughter. 
Penman's manslaughter plea affidavit sets forth the elements and 
facts relative to the manslaughter count as follows: 
Elements: That the defendant as a party to the offense 
recklessly caused the death of another. 
Facts: On October 31, 1987 at 111 South Allen Street, 
Midvale, Utah; the defendant was a party to a robbery 
during the commission of which, the victim of that 
robbery, Spencer Nielson, was killed. 
On October 28, 1988, when Penman entered his plea, the Court 
merely read the elements and facts of the offense as they 
appeared on the plea affidavit. Then after similarly reading the 
facts and elements of the robbery charge, the Court at page 7 
made the only mention of Penman's understanding of the elements 
of the crime as follows: 
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THE COURT: AND YOU UNDERSTAND THE ELEMENTS OF BOTH OF 
THOSE CHARGES. NOW, WHAT IS YOUR PLEA, THEN, 
TO ROBBERY, COUNT 2, ROBBERY, SECOND DEGREE? 
THE DEFENDANT: THAT WOULD BE GUILTY YOUR HONOR. 
It is easy to see how an ill-advised, unskilled layman 
misconstrued the terminology of "party to the offense of a 
robbery" to encompass "as a party to the offense" and improperly 
(unknowingly) entered a plea to a criminal manslaughter offense 
that ambiguously represents defendant's conduct as "a party to 
the offense of robbery during the commission of which, the victim 
of that robbery . . . was killed." 
It is exactly this type of uncertainty and ambiguity that a 
proper plea colloquy, when undertaken, is intended to avoid. 
In State v. Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that this type of pled colloquy is improper. 
Id. at 995. In Abeyta, as in this case, the judge failed to 
discuss the elements of the crimes with the defendant. The 
record in the instant case is devoid of these basic elements as 
appellant was never accorded real notice of the true nature of 
the charge against him. The trial court failed to personally 
establish that defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary 
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and that appellant understood the elements of the crime. The 
record reveals that the court made the only mention of Penman's 
understanding of the elements as follows: "And you understand 
the elements of both of those charges. . . ." (R. 16 and 26.) 
In this case, there was no specific inquiry regarding the 
elements of the charges. Penman's understanding of the elements 
was apparently taken for granted when in fact Penman clearly did 
not understand the charges. At no time prior to the Court 
accepting his plea did Penman understand that he was admitting to 
causing the death of Spencer Nielson. 
Clearly, Penman was not questioned regarding his homicide 
plea to the proper degree. As a result, his due process rights 
have been denied. 
III. PENMAN WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
WHEN MR. MADSEN FAILED TO PROPERLY WITHDRAW AS 
PENMAN'S ATTORNEY. 
One set of circumstances under which a Utah court should 
allow a writ of habeas corpus even if no appeal was filed is in 
the case of ineffective assistance of counsel, or the absence of 
counsel. Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 344-45 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). " [T]he right to counsel is the right to effective 
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assistance of counsel." Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1200 
(D.C. Cir. 1973). In this regard, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated: 
One instance of an obvious injustice would be the 
failure of an attorney to take an appeal when there is 
a substantial claim of a deprivation of a constitu-
tional right which goes to the basic fairness of the 
trial. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 
clearly appropriate in such circumstances and may be 
properly utilized to remedy a failure to perfect an 
appeal occasioned by counsel. 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343-44 (Utah 1980). 
Although Mr. Madsen competently represented Penman while 
actually representing him, Mr. Madsen deprived Penman of 
effective assistance of counsel when he failed to follow the 
procedure for withdrawing as set forth in Rule 4-604, Code of 
Judicial Administration, which reads as follows: 
(A) Consistent with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, an attorney may not withdraw as 
counsel of record in criminal cases without the 
approval of the court. 
(B) A motion to withdraw as an attorney in a 
criminal case shall be made in open court with the 
defendant present unless otherwise ordered by the 
court. 
(2) Withdrawal of counsel after entry of 
judgment. Prior to permitting withdrawal of trial 
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counsel, the trial court shall require counsel to file 
a written statement certifying: 
(A) That the defendant has been advised of 
the right to file a motion for new trial or to seek a 
certificate of probable cause, and if in counsel's 
opinion such action is appropriate, that the same has 
been filed. 
(B) That the defendant has been advised of 
the right to appeal and if in counsel's opinion such 
action is appropriate, that a Notice of Appeal, a 
Request for Transcript, and in appropriate cases, an 
Affidavit of Impecuniosity and an Order requiring the 
appropriate county to bear the costs of preparing the 
transcript have been filed. 
(Emphasis added.) 
None of the preceding provisions was complied with in this 
case. If they were, Penman was not notified of such compliance. 
A look at the events that surrounded the court's decision to deny 
Penman's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea, as well as the 
circumstances of Mr. Madsen's withdrawal as Penman's counsel 
clearly demonstrates why Penman, through no fault of his own, was 
unable to file a timely appeal. 
On August 14, 1992, the court denied Penman's request to 
withdraw his plea of no contest. By letter dated August 28, 
1992, which Penman did not received until early September, 
Mr. Madsen notified Penman that he was withdrawing as Penman's 
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attorney. (R. 23.) However, as required by Rule 4-604, he never 
obtained approval of the court. He also failed to move to 
withdraw in open court in Penman's presence, or file an affidavit 
stating that he had complied with the requirements of withdrawal. 
Thus, Penman was left with no attorney while having less than two 
weeks to file an appeal. 
Furthermore, because Penman thought a hearing would be held 
before Mr. Madsen could withdraw as counsel, and that until such 
a hearing the time period for filing an appeal would be tolled, 
Penman understandably did not file a Notice of Appeal within the 
appropriate time period. "If a counsel's deficiencies were 
sufficiently grievous to deprive appellant of the effective 
assistance of counsel, they constituted a violation of due pro-
cess that is clearly reviewable on appeal or by postconviction 
review." Codiana v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Utah 1983). 
As an inmate at the Utah State Prison, Penman did not have 
access to a law library. Furthermore, Penman's knowledge of the 
law and legal procedure is negligible. Therefore, Penman was 
unaware of the rules for filing an appeal and was unable, without 
assistance of counsel, to comply with such rules. 
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This court in Chess v. Smith recognized that the first right 
of appeal is a "constitutional right." 617 P.2d at 343. In 
Waastaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Utah 
Court of Appeals found: 
One instance of an obvious injustice would be the 
failure of an attorney to take an appeal when there is 
a substantial claim of a deprivation of a constitu-
tional right which goes to the basic fairness of the 
trial. 
Id. at 776. 
The Court further noted: 
The court has uniformly found constitutional error 
without any showing of prejudice when counsel was 
either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the 
accused during a critical stage of the proceeding. Id. 
Because this court has found that the appeal of first right is a 
constitutional right which is guaranteed in all cases, the appeal 
of first right must be considered "a critical stage of the 
proceedings." Moreover, like Chess. where the court held: 
The petitioner should not be held responsible for 
counsel's failure to make an objection to protect a 
basic constitutional right, . . . Id. at 344. 
Appellant in the instant action should not be held 
responsible for his counsel's failure to perfect the appeal. 
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Another reason the procedural default should be excused is 
that the trial court also failed to comply with the procedural 
requirements governing counsel withdrawal as required pursuant to 
4-604. The court failed to require counsel to file a written 
statement certifying that the defendant had been advised of his 
appellate rights, that a notice of appeal had or would be filed 
and the court further permitted counsel withdrawal in defendant's 
absence foreclosing a meaningful opportunity for appellant to 
request new counsel. Simply, like Chess, the trial judge failed 
to exercise any initiative to inquire as to whether the defendant 
wished to waive his rights to counsel and thereby forego his 
constitutional right of appeal. 
As a result of the foregoing, appellant's counsel was 
ineffective and appellant was subjected to ua total denial of the 
constitutional right to counsel" at a critical stage of criminal 
proceedings. 
IV. PENMAN WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
AT HIS PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant can establish 
prejudice by demonstrating that but for counsel's deficient 
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performance a reasonable probability exists that the defendant 
would not have pleaded guilty. (Compare, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 59 (1985).) Penman was denied "effective assistance of 
counsel" during the time of his preliminary hearing (which 
amounted to the deprivation of that substantial right) during the 
preparation and investigation phases of his case and during the 
proceedings wherein he entered his pleas and was sentenced by the 
court, as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions and 
state and federal law. 
Penman maintains that his defense counsel acted in collusion 
with the state prosecution in violation of appellant's rights as 
set forth under federal and state constitutions and state and 
federal law. Specifically, Article I, section 7 and Article I, 
section 12 of the Utah State Constitution, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 77-1-6, 77-32-1 and 77-32-3 as well as the Fifth, Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 
In order to waive a constitutional right, Penman must 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily have chosen not to enjoy 
that right. (See, State v. Ruggeri. 19 Ut. 2d 216, 225, 429 P.2d 
969 (1967); Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah 1980); State 
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v. Dastrup, 818 P.2d 594, 596 (Utah App. 1991), State v. Hoff. 
814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991), State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 
1299 (Utah 1986), State v. Miller. 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986). 
The fact-finding process of the preliminary hearing and/or 
plea colloquy was so tainted by ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, collusion, prosecutorial misconduct or acts of subterfuge as 
to render those proceedings devoid of any meaningful due process, 
preventing the binding court from fully and impartially deter-
mining the questions of law and fact relevant to the case, 
resulting in the denial of a preliminary examination into the 
charges alleged against Penman, the unknowing and involuntary 
entry of Penman's pleas, and ultimately the denial of Penman's 
liberty without due process of law. 
In Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the 
Court of Appeals ruled on a similar matter that is dispositive of 
the current case. There, the appellant entered a plea of guilty 
with the court. Later, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea. 
The court denied his motion and sentenced him to prison. Id. at 
342. 
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The appellant subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas 
corpus claiming irregularities in the reception of his guilty 
plea and ineffective assistance of counsel in connection 
therewith. Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss, which was 
granted by the court on the grounds that appellant failed to file 
an appeal and that habeas corpus was not to be used as a substi-
tute for appeal. Id at 342. 
On appeal, the court held that a writ of habeas corpus was 
appropriate when a misunderstanding exists upon entering a plea. 
11
 [A] n evidentiary hearing must ordinarily be held unless the 
record of a prior hearing shows appellant is clearly not entitled 
to relief." Id. at 345. 
Lancaster v. Cook, 753 P.2d 505 (Utah 1988) is another 
analogous case decided by the Utah Supreme Court. In that case, 
the appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief with 
respect to his guilty plea and conviction of second degree 
murder. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that it 
was inappropriate because appellant did not file a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 6. 
-38-
In his habeas corpus petition, the appellant in Lancaster 
alleged that he misunderstood the ramifications of entering a 
guilty plea to a murder charge. The Utah Supreme Court held that 
even though the habeas corpus petition was submitted nine years 
after the time for appeal had run, given the allegations of 
misunderstanding, it was error to dismiss the petition without an 
evidentiary hearing. Id. 
In the current case, Penman's situation is more deserving of 
a habeas corpus writ than either of the two preceding cases 
because not only did Penman misunderstand the effects of his plea 
due to lack of explanation, but Penman has also been prejudiced 
by the actions of his counsel and the fact that he was not made 
aware of additional exculpatory evidence when he entered his no 
contest plea. 
V. PENMAN WOULD NOT HAVE PLED NO CONTEST HAD HE KNOWN 
OF THE ADDITIONAL EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE. 
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-89 (1963), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the government's failure to 
disclose evidence favorable to a defendant who specifically 
requested it violated defendant's due process rights. See Miller 
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v. Angliker. 848 F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (2d Cir. 1988) (the Brady 
holding also applies to guilty pleas that are affected by the 
government's nondisclosure of evidence). 
Since entering his no contest plea, Penman has discovered 
several important items of evidence. If Penman had been aware of 
such evidence when he entered his plea, he would not have pled no 
contest to the charges filed against him. Such evidence 
includes: 1) results of a ballistics test that was exculpatory 
in nature; 2) documents which establish ulterior motives for the 
State's witness, Rick Lewis, to testify, that Lewis had an 
immunity agreement with the state, that the state failed to 
disclose these facts, and that Lewis perjured himself while under 
oath; and 3) documents establishing that a subpoena was not 
served on State's witness Monte Bo Johnston. 
The forementioned ballistics report was compiled on 
August 12, 1988, two months before Penman entered his no contest 
pleas. Failure to disclose the existence of such a report, in 
addition to other nondisclosures set forth in Penman's Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and described herein, sufficiently justify the 
remedies requested in Penman's petition. 
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Penman's pleas were not voluntary because they were based on 
false and misleading information provided to the court and to 
Penman. 
Monte "Bo" Johnston was the sole witness for the State 
identifying Penman as the individual who shot Mr. Nielson. 
However, Mr. Johnston, who was given immunity by the State, 
failed to appear at the preliminary hearing on June 16, 1988 and 
upon information and belief is currently a fugitive from justice. 
The only remaining State's witness is Rick Lewis, also a parti-
cipant in the robbery. Mr. Lewis placed Penman at the scene but 
could not identify Penman as the individual who shot Mr. Nielson. 
On the contrary, Mr. Lewis identified Mr. Johnston as the 
individual who physically abused Mr. Nielson and also said that 
he thought Mr. Johnston was the individual who shot Mr. Nielson. 
Furthermore, at the June 16, 1988 preliminary hearing, 
Mr. Lewis, the State's only witness, lied under oath regarding 
any Meals" he had made in exchange for testifying. The 
following questioning occurred there by the prosecutor: 
Q And have there been any promises as to what 
disposition that you will personally have 
concerning the outcome of this case. 
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A No. 
Q No one has mentioned that you will have charges 
filed, not have charges filed or anything of that 
nature; is that correct? 
A That's right. 
(R. 38.) 
However, in a prior sworn statement by Mr. Lewis gave to the 
prosecutor on February 4, 1988, the following colloquy occurred: 
Q If in the event that you do not make your daily 
call ins or for other reasons you are picked up 
for other charges or for some reason we find that 
your statement given today is not truthful state-
ment, that all deals are off. That you will then 
be filed on as a defendant in this matter and that 
all statements previously given, excuse me, and 
that this statement given now under oath will then 
be used against you. Is that understood? 
A Yes. 
Q Just to make it perfectly clear, Rick, everything 
you've told us is the truth. 
A Yes. 
Q If for some reason, as I stated before, you're not 
telling us the truth all deals are off. 
A Uh huh (indicating affirmatively). 
Q Furthermore, not only all deals are off, we will 
file against you as a defendant, charge you with 
-42-
murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary 
and two counts of theft and use this statement 
against you. Are you aware of that? 
A Okay. 
(R. 39.) 
Penman did not become aware of Mr. Lewis' untruthful state-
ment regarding any Meals," and corresponding issues regarding 
credibility, until some time after his conviction. (R. 39.) At 
the time of entry of his pleas, Penman believed that both 
Mr. Johnston and Mr. Lewis had turned State's witness and would 
be testifying against him. This was a significant factor in 
Penman's decision to enter into the plea agreements. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
The unusual circumstances required for a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus are clearly present in this case. Penman's right to due 
process are of paramount concern and should be given deference by 
this Court. Rule 11 was not complied with when Penman entered 
his guilty plea. Moreover, Penman's ability to appeal the 
Court's refusal to allow Penman to withdraw his guilty plea was 
prejudiced by Mr. Madsen's improper withdrawal. Therefore, this 
Court should grant Penman's request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
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allowing an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of appraising 
Penman's claims. 
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ADDENDUM 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) lb testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
77-32-1. Minimum standards for defense of indigent de-
fendants. 
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of indigent persons 
in criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of the state 
in accordance with the following minimum standards: 
(1) provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial 
probability of the deprivation of the indigent defendant's liberty; 
(2) afford timely representation by competent legal counsel; 
(3) provide the investigatory and other facuities necessary for a com-
plete defense; 
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; 
(5) proceed with a first appeal of right; and 
(6) prosecute other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by 
defense counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and 
subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. 
77-32-3. Duties of assigned counsel — Compensation. 
(1) When representing an indigent person the assigned counsel shall: 
(a) Counsel and defend him at every stage of the proceeding following 
assignment; and 
(b) Prosecute any first appeal of right or other remedies before or after 
conviction that he considers to be in the interest of justice except for other 
and subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. 
(2) An assigned counsel shall not have the duty or power under this section 
to represent an indigent defendant in any discretionary appeal or action for a 
discretionary writ, other than in a meaningful first appeal of right to assure 
the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in 
the context of the appellate process of this state. 
(3) An assigned counsel for an indigent defendant shall be entitled to 
compensation upon the approval of the district court where the original trial 
was held, upon a showing that the defendant has been denied a constitutional 
right or that there was newly discovered evidence that would show the 
defendant's innocence and that the legal services rendered by counsel were 
other than that required under this act or under a separate fee arrangement 
and were necessary for the indigent defendant and not for the purpose of 
delaying the judgment of the original trier of fact. 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-3, Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(1) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be repre-
sented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant may not be required to plead until he has had a reasonable time to 
confer with counsel. 
(2) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the 
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant re-
fuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall 
enter a plea of not guilty. 
(3) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(4) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for 
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defen-
dant, or his counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a 
jury trial. 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and may 
not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(a) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation, to a jury trial, and to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all of 
those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have 
the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence that 
may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; and 
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(6) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under 
Section 77-13-6. 
(7) (a) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be 
approved by the court. 
(b) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to 
sentence is not binding on the court. 
(8) (a) The judge may not participate in plea discussions prior to any agree-
ment being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(bj When a tentative plea agreement has been reached that contem-
plates entry of a plea in the expectation that other charges will be 
dropped or dismissed the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit 
the disclosure to him of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to 
the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether he will approve the 
proposed disposition. 
(c) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, he shall advise the defendant and 
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea. 
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(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-exam-
ine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the atten-
dance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, 
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any' 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be 
approved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to 
sentence is not binding on the court. 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2* When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agree-
ment and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. 
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense 
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant 
and then ca\) upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defen-
dant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defen-
dant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 1,1993, revised the subdi-
vision designations, substituting letters for 
numbers and vice versa; inserted "or guilty 
and mentally ill" in the introductory para-
graph in Subdivision (e) and in Subdivision (f); 
rewrote Subdivision (e^3) to list more rights; 
inserted "and if applicable, the minimum man-
datory nature of the minimum sentence" in 
Subdivision (e)(5); added Subdivision (e)(8V, de-
leted 44that contemplates entry of a plea in the 
expectation that other charges will be dropped 
or dismissed" after "has been reached" in Sub-
division (h)(2); added Subdivision (i); and made 
stylistic changes throughout the rule. 
Cross-References. — Inadmissibility of 
pleas, plea discussions or related statements, 
U.R.E. 410. 
Time limit for filing motion to withdraw plea 
of guilty or no contest, § 77-13-6. 
Rule 4-604. Withdrawal of counsel in criminal and delin-
quency cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for withdrawal of counsel in criminal 
cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record and not of record. 
Statement of th* Bute'; 
(1) Withdrawal of counsel prior to entry of judgment. 
(A) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney 
may not withdraw as counsel of record in criminal cases without the 
approval of the court. 
(B) A motion to withdraw as an attorney in a criminal case shall be 
made in open court with the defendant present unless otherwise ordered 
by the court. 
(2) Withdrawal of counsel after entry of judgment. Prior to permitting with-
drawal of trial counsel, the trial court shall require counsel to file a written 
statement certifying: 
(A) That the defendant has been advised of the right to file a motion for 
new trial or to seek a certificate of probable cause, and if in counsel's 
opinion such action is appropriate, that the same has been filed. 
(B) That the defendant has been advised of the right to appeal and if in 
counsel's opinion such action is appropriate, that a Notice of Appeal, a 
Request for Transcript, and in appropriate cases, an Affidavit of 
Impecuniosity and an Order requiring the appropriate county to bear the 
costs of preparing the transcript have been filed. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; March 31, 1992.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- cept where withdrawal may result in a delay of 
ment inserted "and delinquency" in the rule the trial or prejudice to the client. In those 
heading, rewrote Subdivision (1)(A), which for- cases, an attorney may not withdraw without 
merly provided "Consistent with the Rules of the approval of the court," and made stylistic 
Professional Conduct, an attorney may with- changes, 
draw as counsel of record in criminal cases ex-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 955 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Stttion 
\t [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.] 
• '1 [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
it [Disqualification to hold office.] 
$'t [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
£%/_ eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
**£ [Power to enforce amendment.] 
• % • • 
ejection 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
P protection.] 
# All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
/Jribject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
-ftates and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
: Bike or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
J immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
;8tate deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
\ fafi process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
\ tion the equal protection of the laws. 
8ec 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
J ment.] . Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
vliiole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
i taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
rf electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
8tates, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
rdal Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
'thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
.being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
8tates, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
.•hall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
;ttale citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec, 3, [Disqualification to hold office,] 
r No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
fcvil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
*ho, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
P^ss, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
^y State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
*ay State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
•ball have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
•aaae, or pi*- • -*'i or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
•uch disability. 
8*c. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
1 the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
r e d by law. including debts incurred Tor Davment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
lpprislation the nrovisions of this article. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 1896 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 1994 
